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·16 min read

SMTP AUTH Shuts Off in December. Act Like It's Permanent.

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SMTP AUTH Shuts Off in December. Act Like It's Permanent.

What MSPs Must Fix Before Basic Auth Gets Switched Off at the End of December

At the end of December, Microsoft switches off SMTP AUTH Basic authentication in every existing Exchange Online tenant. Yes, there's a switch to turn it back on. No, that switch is not a plan. Treat the last week of December as the day it dies.

In This Article

  • TL;DR: What MSPs Need to Know
  • What Is SMTP AUTH?
  • Why "Off by Default" Is the Real Deadline
  • What Actually Breaks at the End of December
  • Where SMTP AUTH Hides in Client Tenants
  • The Inventory Approach
  • The Migration Playbook
  • The Five Gotchas That Will Bite You
  • Six-Week Action Plan
  • The Takeaway for MSPs
  • Frequently Asked Questions

TL;DR: What MSPs Need to Know

TL;DR — What You Need to Know
Key dateEnd of December 2026: SMTP AUTH Basic authentication is disabled by default for every existing Exchange Online tenant.
The re-enable switchIt exists, and it's a trap. It only buys time until a final removal date Microsoft hasn't published, while the client keeps running on a password with no MFA. Plan as if December is final.
New tenantsAny tenant created after December 2026 gets SMTP AUTH Basic auth unavailable by default. OAuth is the supported method.
What breaksAny device or app sending mail through smtp.office365.com with a stored username and password. Scans, alerts and notifications stop arriving.
Who's affectedAlmost every SMB tenant you manage: scan-to-email copiers, NAS and backup alerts, line-of-business apps, legacy apps on local servers, website forms, old scripts.
Migration pathsOAuth where the device supports it, a third-party SMTP relay service for devices that can't do OAuth, High Volume Email for internal-only senders, a connector-based relay, or Microsoft Graph for apps.
Key caveatRe-enabling Basic auth is not a fix. It's a documented weak-auth exception with an expiry date nobody knows yet.
Action nowRun the SMTP AUTH Clients Submission report in every managed tenant this week. Ten weeks sounds like a lot until you add the holiday change freeze.

What Is SMTP AUTH?

SMTP AUTH, also called client submission, is how a device or app hands an email to Exchange Online for delivery. The device connects to smtp.office365.com on port 587, signs in as a mailbox, and sends.

For years, that sign-in was a plain username and password stored in the device. That's Basic authentication: no MFA, no token, no Conditional Access. Microsoft turned it off for most other Exchange Online protocols in 2022, but SMTP AUTH got a pass because so much hardware depends on it.

The replacement is OAuth 2.0. It works well if the device supports it. A lot of older ones don't.

Why "Off by Default" Is the Real Deadline

In our Teams Connector post, the point was that the deadline was finally real. This one is just as real, even if Microsoft's wording makes it sound optional. "Disabled by default" reads like a soft launch. For your clients, it's an outage.

Here's how we got here, all from Message Center entry MC786329:

  • April 15, 2024: Microsoft announces it will permanently remove Basic auth for SMTP AUTH in September 2025.
  • Later update: The removal moves to a phased rollout, starting March 1, 2026 and completing April 30, 2026.
  • Then: The deprecation is put on hold.
  • January 27, 2026: A new timeline. Nothing changes through December 2026. At the end of December, Basic auth is disabled by default for existing tenants. Microsoft will announce the final removal date in the second half of 2027.

Three dates, three slips. It's tempting to read that history and decide you can wait a little longer. Don't. This time Microsoft didn't publish another date that can slip. It changed the default, and the default changes at the end of December no matter what happens to the final removal date.

⚠️ Critical: The easiest response in the first week of January is to flip SMTP AUTH back on in every tenant that breaks. That doesn't solve anything. It turns a migration project into a weak-auth exception across your whole client base, with an expiry date Microsoft hasn't published yet.

Treat the end of December as the removal date. The re-enable switch is an emergency brake, not a plan, and it disappears whenever Microsoft decides it does.

What Actually Breaks at the End of December

Once the default flips, anything still authenticating to smtp.office365.com with a username and password can no longer send. That includes:

  • Scan-to-email copiers and multifunction printers
  • Backup, NAS, UPS and firewall alerts
  • ERPs and line-of-business apps sending invoices and statements
  • Legacy apps on local servers and VMs, from finance servers to truck scales reporting weigh-ins
  • Website forms, helpdesk SMTP connectors and Send-MailMessage scripts

⚠️ Critical: For the end user, the failure is effectively silent. The copier still says "scan complete." The backup still runs. The error, if there is one, sits in a device log nobody opens. The first person to notice is the accountant asking why the signed contract never hit her inbox.

The worst case isn't the copier. It's the backup appliance that has been quietly failing for three weeks, and the only alert that would have told you was the email that couldn't send.

Where SMTP AUTH Hides in Client Tenants

If a client has been on Microsoft 365 for more than a few years, there's at least one SMTP AUTH sender nobody remembers setting up. Common hiding spots:

  • The copier in the back office. An installer from the leasing company configured it once, years ago, with a mailbox password. That installer doesn't work there anymore, and neither does the person whose mailbox it was.
  • The "scanner@" or "noreply@" mailbox. A shared or licensed account created only to relay mail, with a password that has never rotated because rotating it breaks everything.
  • The accounting system. ERPs and practice-management tools that email invoices and statements on a schedule. Nobody thinks of them as an email client.
  • Local servers and VMs running legacy apps. This is the one most people miss. The finance server in the closet. The VM running an app nobody has upgraded since 2015. The truck scale at the warehouse that emails every weigh-in. If it runs on a local server and sends email, assume it uses SMTP AUTH until you prove otherwise.
  • The website. A contact form or WordPress plugin built by an agency that left three redesigns ago, still holding a Microsoft 365 credential in a config file.
  • Infrastructure gear. NAS, UPS, firewall and backup appliances whose only job is to email you when something goes wrong.
  • Scripts on a server under someone's desk. Scheduled PowerShell reports using Send-MailMessage, the most likely to be critical and the least likely to be documented.

The audit problem: Microsoft gives you a per-tenant report, not a portfolio view. Across 40 or 50 tenants, you're running the same report 40 or 50 times, and it still can't tell you which copier on which floor owns which mailbox.

The Inventory Approach

Pass 1 — SMTP AUTH Clients Submission Report

In the Exchange admin center, go to Reports > Mail flow > SMTP AUTH clients report. Since October 2024, it includes an Authentication Protocol column showing whether each sender uses Basic auth or OAuth. Anything showing Basic is on borrowed time. Export it per tenant and note the sending account, volume and last activity.

Pass 2 — PowerShell Exposure Check

The report only shows who sent recently. It doesn't show who can send. Connect to Exchange Online PowerShell and check both levels:

  • Tenant level: Get-TransportConfig | Format-List SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled
  • Mailbox level: Get-CASMailbox -ResultSize Unlimited | Select-Object DisplayName, PrimarySmtpAddress, SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled

The mailbox setting has three states, not two. $true means blocked, $false means explicitly allowed, and an empty value means the mailbox inherits the tenant setting. Hold on to that; it comes back in the gotchas.

Output a CSV per tenant: tenant ID, mailbox, mailbox setting, effective setting, and whether it appeared in the Pass 1 report.

Pass 3 — Ask the Client

Some senders only fire monthly or quarterly: statement runs, year-end reports, a backup that only emails on failure. They won't show up in a recent report. Ask the client's IT contact or office manager:

  • Which devices scan to email?
  • Which systems email invoices, statements or alerts?
  • Who built the website, and does the contact form send through Microsoft 365?
  • Are there local servers or VMs running older apps, like a finance server, a warehouse system or a truck scale, that send email automatically?

The Migration Playbook

Work through the inventory in priority order: alerting and backup first, business-critical sends second, convenience last. And remember that not every fix has to run through Microsoft. For each sender, pick the path that fits:

Sender typeBest pathWatch out for
Device or app that supports OAuth 2.0Update firmware or config, register the app, switch to OAuthOlder models may have no OAuth option at all
Device or app with no OAuth supportPoint it at a third-party SMTP relay service that still supports authenticated SMTPNew credentials to manage, plus SPF and DKIM for the sending domain
Sends only to recipients inside the tenantMicrosoft 365 High Volume EmailInternal recipients only
Device on a static IP, sends externallyExchange Online connector-based relay (IP or certificate)Needs a static IP or certificate, plus SPF updates
Custom app or scriptMove to Microsoft Graph sendMail with an app registrationScope the permission to one mailbox, not the whole tenant

SMTP AUTH Isn't Going Away Everywhere

Microsoft is retiring Basic auth for SMTP AUTH inside Exchange Online. Authenticated SMTP itself is alive and well. Dedicated SMTP relay and transactional email services still accept it, so a device that will never get OAuth firmware can keep sending: point it at the relay's host and port, give it the relay's credentials, and authorize the relay in the client's SPF and DKIM records.

For finance servers, truck scales and copiers with no firmware path, this is often the fastest fix, and it doesn't need anything from Microsoft.

⚠️ What about hybrid Exchange? You'll see "route it through the on-prem Exchange server" suggested as a workaround. We don't recommend it. Keeping an on-prem Exchange server alive just to relay mail means another server to patch, another attack surface, and more risk, all to avoid fixing the sender. If a client already runs hybrid for other reasons, fix the sender anyway.

For each sender you migrate:

  1. Confirm the path in the table above and check the vendor's OAuth support for that exact model or version
  2. Create or reuse a dedicated sending mailbox per tenant, not a person's mailbox
  3. Reconfigure the device or app and send a test message to an internal and an external address
  4. Confirm the sender now shows OAuth (or disappears) in the SMTP AUTH clients report
  5. Block SMTP AUTH on that mailbox once nothing depends on it
  6. Record the change, the device, and its location in the client's documentation

The Five Gotchas That Will Bite You

1. The Tri-State Trap

The one-liner most people copy filters for mailboxes where SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled equals $false. That misses every mailbox with an empty value, which inherits the tenant setting. On a tenant nobody has locked down, the check can report zero exposed mailboxes while every single one is exposed. Always resolve the effective setting, not just the mailbox value.

2. Tenant Off Doesn't Mean Mailbox Off

Turning SMTP AUTH off for the organization doesn't stop it for mailboxes where it was explicitly enabled. A mailbox set to $false still allows Basic auth after the default flips. Those per-mailbox exceptions are exactly what drifts quietly after a technician's late-night fix.

3. Security Defaults and Conditional Access Can Get There First

Security Defaults block legacy authentication regardless of what the mailbox setting says. So does a Conditional Access policy blocking legacy auth. If you're hardening a tenant this quarter, the copier may break before December, and the ticket will land on whoever changed the policy.

4. Some Devices Have No Way Out

Not every copier gets an OAuth firmware update. Some vendors simply mark older models as unsupported. Check before you promise the client a free reconfiguration. Sometimes the honest answer is a relay or a hardware refresh, and that belongs in a quote, not a surprise.

5. The Credential Belongs to Someone Who Left

The mailbox the copier signs in with is often a former employee's account, kept licensed just so scanning works. Migrating is your chance to kill it. Leaving it is an unmonitored, never-rotated credential with no MFA sitting in a device on the network.

Six-Week Action Plan

The calendar is tighter than it looks. Most MSPs and clients freeze changes for the last two weeks of December, so plan for six working weeks, not eight.

  • Week 1 — Inventory: Run Pass 1 and Pass 2 across every managed tenant. Output: one consolidated sheet, one row per sender, with tenant, device, mailbox, auth type and owner.
  • Week 2 — Client conversations: Run Pass 3. Confirm what each sender is, who depends on it, and whether the device supports OAuth. Flag hardware that needs a relay or replacement and quote it now.
  • Week 3 — Critical migrations: Backup alerts, monitoring, and anything tied to billing or compliance. Test each one before moving on.
  • Week 4 — Remaining senders: Copiers, website forms, scripts. Kill the former-employee mailboxes as you go.
  • Week 5 — Lock it down: Block SMTP AUTH at the tenant level and on every mailbox that no longer needs it. Any exception that has to stay gets a documented owner, reason and review date.
  • Week 6 — Buffer: Something will surface that wasn't in the inventory. A quarterly statement run, a new tenant, a VM someone forgot was still running.

The Takeaway for MSPs

This is the kind of Microsoft change that splits MSPs into two groups. One group spends the first week of January re-enabling Basic auth tenant by tenant and calling it handled. The other group uses November to find every sender, migrate what can move, and document what can't.

The first group hasn't saved anything. They've swapped a planned migration for an unplanned one, on Microsoft's timeline, with clients who already lived through one outage. The second group walks into the next QBR with a credential risk that got smaller, not one that got renewed.

I'd rather find fifty forgotten copiers in November than explain fifty missing scans in January.

With Optimize365, MSPs can set one baseline across every managed tenant, get alerted when a setting drifts away from it, and record any exception they accept with a reason attached, so the exception you approve in December is still visible in 2027. Check it out here.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is SMTP AUTH going away in December 2026?

For practical purposes, yes. At the end of December 2026, Microsoft disables SMTP AUTH Basic authentication by default in every existing Exchange Online tenant, and anything still using it stops sending. Admins can re-enable it for now, but that's a temporary exception, not a plan. Microsoft will announce the final removal date in the second half of 2027, with no guarantee of a long runway.

Can I re-enable SMTP AUTH Basic authentication after December?

Technically yes, for now. Practically, don't plan on it. It only buys time until Microsoft announces the final removal date, and it leaves a weak-authentication exception in the tenant. If you have to use it, treat it as a short-term exception with an owner, a reason and a review date.

How do I find what uses SMTP AUTH Basic authentication in a tenant?

Run the SMTP AUTH clients report in the Exchange admin center under Reports > Mail flow. It shows whether each sender uses Basic auth or OAuth. Then check the tenant and mailbox SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled settings in Exchange Online PowerShell to see who can still send, not just who sent recently.

How do I make sure SMTP AUTH stays off across every client tenant?

Microsoft's change only sets the default. Anyone with admin access can turn SMTP AUTH back on in a tenant or a single mailbox, and nothing alerts you when they do. Optimize365's control all-6.5.4 disables SMTP AUTH, the same change Microsoft is making at the end of December, and applies it across every managed tenant. Once a tenant is fixed, the control keeps tracking it. If someone re-enables SMTP AUTH later, Optimize365 flags it as drift, so a late-night "quick fix" doesn't quietly become permanent.

Will scan-to-email stop working?

Scan-to-email that signs in to Microsoft 365 with a stored username and password will stop sending at the end of December. Scan-to-email itself isn't going away. The device needs to move to OAuth, a third-party SMTP relay, or another supported path.

What if my printer doesn't support OAuth?

Point it at a third-party SMTP relay service that still supports authenticated SMTP, use an Exchange Online connector-based relay, or, if it only emails internal recipients, use Microsoft 365 High Volume Email. Don't keep an on-prem Exchange server running just to relay for it. If none of those fit, the device may need replacing.